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1. Introduction  
Much of the empirical literature finds that energy tax exemptions and concessions tend to be 
costly compared to uniform taxation (Böhringer and Rutherford, 1997; Ekins and Speck, 
1999; Felder and Schleiniger, 2002; and Bye and Nyborg, 2003). This result is reinforced if 
also accounting for that the implicit renouncement of tax revenue could be used to cut other, 
more distortionary taxes; see contributions in Goulder, Parry and Burtraw (1997), Farrow 
(1999), Fullerton and Metcalf (1998), Parry, Williams and Goulder (1999), and Bovenberg 
(1999). In spite of these findings, several countries have exempted selected energy-dependent 
industries from energy taxation. In most cases, a major explanation has to be sought in the 
fact that these industries constitute powerful lobby-groups. An interesting question arising 
from this apparent trade-off situation between overall efficiency and industrial distribution 
arguments, is whether uniform taxation is still welfare enhancing if combined with compensa-
tion schemes that alleviate the political pressure from powerful industry interests. 
Existing studies of large economies have come to rather optimistic conclusions. In a study of 
a uniform CO2 tax in the U.S. case, Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) find that the welfare gain 
is reduced by only a tenth, if the reform is supplied by compensation for profit losses in the 
American energy industry. Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) find that avoiding lay-offs in the 
German energy industry is less costly when combining a uniform CO2 tax with wage subsi-
dies to the industry than when using CO2 tax exemptions. In both cases, the energy producers 
are able to shift most of the CO2 tax burden on to their customers through increases in their 
producer prices. Thus, after compensation, significant parts of the revenue are still left for 
cuts in other, distortionary tax wedges. A crucial assumption behind these results is that the 
regulating country is sufficiently large in the markets for energy products to affect the prices.   
However, the smaller, and more open, the country, the more exposed will firms be to exter-
nally given world market prices and conditions, and the smaller will be the scope for shifting 
tax burdens on to demanders or suppliers through price incidences. We examine a case where 
the Norwegian energy-intensive export sector is included into the electricity tax system. The 
sector, comprising the three industries producing Metals, Pulp and paper articles, and Indus-
trial chemicals, enjoys several concessional policy measures, including low payroll taxes mo-
tivated by its peripheral location, low electricity prices according to favourable long-term 
power contracts, and exemptions from energy taxes applying to both the consumer tax on 
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electricity and the CO2 tax on process-related emissions. As the sector is first of all consum-
ing energy in the form of electricity this analysis focuses on the electricity tax system. Its 
electricity consumption constitutes almost 1/3 of the country's total. In the present electricity 
tax system, all manufacturing industries are exempted, while final consumers, primary indus-
tries, and service industries, including transportation and construction, pay a rate of 1.2 Euro-
cents/KWh. As the current electricity production is mainly based on hydropower, the ex-
pressed arguments for taxing electricity consumption are protection of the waterfall environ-
ments, along with revenue rising. It is anticipated that power based on natural gas will turn 
profitable within the next decades and reinforce the environmental arguments.  
As for fossil fuel taxation, previous analyses indicate that the trade-off issue between effi-
ciency and political feasibility is relevant to the Norwegian electricity policies. Bye et al. 
(1999) find that a more uniform electricity price would improve welfare, but at the expense of 
the energy-intensive export sector. The sector is politically influential primarily due to its role 
as the most important generator of export revenues besides the oil and gas sector, as well as to 
its location. It contributes with between 10-15 percent to the Norwegian total. Its high degree 
of exposure to internationally given product prices makes the sector highly vulnerable to cost 
changes. In addition, they buy their input of power in an electricity market that has undergone 
major liberalising efforts the last decade and is now fully integrated into a Nordic market. 
Similar processes have taken place in several electricity markets recently, with the Nordic 
market as a pioneer in many respects (see Wolak, 2000 for a survey). By analysing an intro-
duction of the electricity tax in the manufacturing industries by means of a dynamic, numeri-
cal equilibrium model, we find a compensation cost amounting to between 16 and 44 percent 
of the welfare gain associated with the tax uniformation. The cost depends on the design of 
the compensation scheme, in particular on the degree of productivity gains released by the 
scheme. Characteristics of the Norwegian manufacturing industries are consistent with pres-
ence of monopolistic competition among firms producing varieties of different characteristics. 
Given that increasing the number of varieties increases the efficiency value of the good (Dixit 
and Stiglitz, 1977), compensation costs will be reduced if compensation is offered in a man-
ner that avoids exit of firms from the energy intensive export sector (or encourages entry).  
Irrespective of the nature of the compensation scheme, the compensation costs turn out to be 
surprisingly low and will far from erode the welfare gain of the reform. The main explanation 
is that there still remains scope for the Norwegian demand and supply impulses to influence 
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the Nordic market prices of electricity. Sensitivity tests show that the role of the electricity 
market is important. With no flexibility in international trade in electricity, the compensation 
costs fall to a third, while a hypothetical world market regime with completely externally de-
termined electricity prices leaves little scope for tax incidence and compensation costs more 
than doubles.  
The paper proceeds by presenting the methodological aspects of the analysis in Section 2, 
including the basic feature of the computable general equilibrium model. Section 3 outlines 
and explains the results and illustrates their sensitivity to the electricity market openness and 
the compensation scheme design. Section 4 concludes.   
2. Method 
2.1 The design of the analysis 
The main question posed in this analysis is whether costs of compensating the Norwegian 
energy-intensive export sector tend to offset, or even exceed, the welfare potential of an en-
ergy tax reform. We answer this by simulating three reform scenarios on a dynamic CGE 
model for Norway. In the Reference Reform Scenario (Scenario 1A) the current electricity tax 
exemptions of the manufacturing industries are abolished. In two Full Reform Scenarios 
(Scenarios 1B and 1C), the same electricity tax reform is accompanied by compensation 
schemes designed to neutralise the loss of pure profit rents within the energy-intensive export 
sector.1 
The compensation schemes of the two full reform scenarios differ in design. In scenario 1B, 
we transfer the subsidy lumpsum to those firms remaining in the sector in spite of the tax 
changes. This corresponds to a case where the lobby groups tend to be dominated by, and to 
work in the interests of, the largest and most efficient firms. It implies that the subsidies com-
pensate the profit of the sector as a whole. In scenario 1C, the compensation is given as a sub-
sidy to all producers operating in the sector before the tax reform, according to their profit 
loss. All reform scenarios are changes from a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The BAU is 
                                                     
1 One could argue that profit losses faced by foreign owners can be left out of the Norwegian welfare accounting, and, 
analogously, that compensation to foreigners should be counted as welfare losses. In the full reform, the foreign profit losses 
in the energy intensive export sector, and their compensation, offset each other and eliminate the problem. 
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a 50 years' projection of the Norwegian economy.2 Policy variables are kept at their (real) 
1999 levels, and, in particular, all manufacturing industries are exempted from the electricity 
tax.  
Compared to the BAU scenario, the reference reform in 1A consists of two components: 
i) The electricity tax component: The manufacturing industries are faced by an electricity 
tax at the same level as the tax already imposed on households and remaining indus-
tries. 
ii) The electricity tax revenue recycling component: The revenue is recycled back 
through a uniform percentage pay roll tax rate decrease for all firms. 
In scenario 1B, these reform components are supplied by the simultaneous introduction of a 
non-distortionary subsidy. Thus, compared to BAU, the reform will also influence through:  
iii) The compensation financing component: The revenue from the electricity tax is short-
ened in order to finance a subsidy that exactly compensates for the profit losses in the 
energy-intensive export sector. The joint effect of ii) and iii) in this scenario thus re-
sults in a smaller percentage pay roll tax rate decrease (compared to BAU) than fol-
lowing from ii), alone.  
In scenario 1C, where subsidies are handed out to all firms operating in BAU, the subsidy 
will, in itself, hamper exit. Consequently a fourth reform component also generates effects in 
this scenario: 
iv) The compensation subsidy component: The subsidy wedge has efficiency effects.  
The compensation cost constitutes the difference between the welfare results of the full re-
forms (1B and 1C) and the reference reform (1A).  
We measure welfare by the total discounted utility of the household in each period, where 
utility is an aggregate of material consumption and leisure. We let the welfare effect in sce-
nario 1A, compared to the BAU scenario, serve as a reference for the compensation cost. Note 
that the difference between the compensation costs in 1C and 1B is the effects from the com-
pensation subsidy component in iv). Thus, these scenarios can also be utilised to split the 
                                                     
2 Most assumptions are in accordance with the Long Term Programme of the Norwegian government; see Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance (2001). 
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compensation costs in 1C into iii) the compensation financing component and iv) the compen-
sation subsidy component.  
We supply these scenarios with sensitivity simulations that shed light on the role of the tax 
incidence in the electricity market. According to our hypothesis, in particular the openness of 
the electricity market is decisive for the compensation costs in a small, open economy as the 
Norwegian. We thus test the sensitivity of the results to the degree of the electricity market 
openness. In the scenarios labelled 2, the reference and the full energy tax reform, respec-
tively, are simulated within a hypothetical, nationally closed electricity market regime (where 
trade flows are inflexible), while in scenarios 3 they are simulated in a hypothetical situation 
with a fully liberalised world market for electricity where prices are exogenous.  
2.2. Basic features of the computable general equilibrium model 
2.2.1 General features 
The employed numerical intertemporal general equilibrium model for the Norwegian econ-
omy gives a detailed description of the structures of economic policy, production, and con-
sumption in the Norwegian economy. The model has 41 private and 8 governmental produc-
tion activities, all listed in appendix A, and 26 consumer goods. A more detailed description 
of the model is found in Bye (2000) and Fæhn and Holmøy (2000). 
2.2.2. Consumer behaviour 
Consumption, labour supply and savings result from the decisions of an infinitely lived repre-
sentative, forward-looking consumer, who maximises present value of utility subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint (the model of consumer behaviour is described in more detail 
in appendix B.1). Utility originates from material consumption and leisure consumption, ac-
cording to an Origo-adjusted Constant Elasticity of Substitution function (OCES); see Bye 
(2003). The material consumption is allocated across 26 different consumer goods in a nested 
OCES function (see figure B.2, appendix B); see Wold (1998). The OCES specification al-
lows the income elasticities to vary among goods. 
2.2.3. Producer behaviour, technology and product markets 
Producer behaviour is generally specified at the firm level. Holmøy and Hægeland (1997) 
provide a detailed description. The structure of the production technology is represented by a 
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nested tree-structure of CES-aggregates given in figure B.1, appendix B. All factors are com-
pletely mobile and malleable3.  The manager of the firm is assumed to be rational and for-
ward-looking and maximise the present value of the cashflow to owners; see details in 
Holmøy, Larsen and Vennemo (1993) and Holmøy, Nordén and Strøm (1994).   
The domestic market structure is assumed to be "large group case of monopolistic competi-
tion", where each firm has some market power in their respective home markets. Markups are 
calibrated according to empirical analyses that find evidence for markup pricing by Norwe-
gian firms (Klette, 1994 and Bowitz and Cappelen, 2001). Each firm produces a variety of a 
product that is an imperfect substitute for other varieties of this product (represented by 
Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences). The elasticity of substitution among the varieties of a 
product is calibrated to be consistent with the estimated markup ratios.4  
In the world markets prices are assumed to be unresponsive to domestic demand and supply, 
and domestic firms have no market power. The export markets and the home markets are as-
sumed segregated, due to firms' adjustment costs of reallocating deliveries between the two 
markets. Quite analogously, there is imperfect substitution between domestic and imported 
products according to the Armington hypothesis.  
The sector-specific number of firms and varieties is determined by an entry-exit condition, 
which requires that the after-tax pure profit of the marginal, least efficient firm equals a fixed 
entry cost. The present value of all future fixed costs represents the necessary investments in 
entrepreneurship (knowledge, network, risk etc.) in order to enter the industry. The pure rent 
origins from decreasing returns to scale, as well as the markup on marginal costs in the pro-
duction for the domestic markets.  
The only import and export price that responds to changes in domestic behaviour is the elec-
tricity price. The Norwegian electricity market is part of a Nordic, competitive market and 
domestic supply and demand empirically affect the market price. The sensitivity of the elec-
tricity price to Norwegian net import is estimated by using simulated data from a numerical, 
Nordic electricity market model (NORDMOD); see Aune and Hansen (2004).  Johnsen 
(1998) documents the NORDMOD model. The current Norwegian supply of electricity is 
based on hydropower. This supply is assumed to grow exogenously, but at a decreasing rate, 
                                                     
3 One exception is the production of electricity, see Holmøy, Nordén and Strøm (1994). 
4 In order to maximise profits, the firm sets the markup ratio eqal to σ/(σ−1), where σ is the substitution elasticity among 
varieties. 
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to represent the limited possibility to develop new hydropower capacity. Along the paths, gas 
power capacity is introduced as a back- stop technology when the electricity price exceeds the 
marginal cost of expanding the gas power capacity.  
2.2.4. The government 
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and purchases goods and services from 
the industries and abroad. Overall government expenditure is exogenous and increases at a 
constant rate. The model incorporates a detailed account of the government’s revenues and 
expenditures. In the policy experiments it is required that the nominal deficit and real gov-
ernment spending follow the same path as in the baseline scenario, implying revenue neutral-
ity in each period. 
3. Results  
3.1 The Reference Reform: Effects of equalising the electricity tax. 
As outlined in Section 2.1, the reference reform consists of two components. Firstly, extend-
ing the electricity tax base to include all electricity consumption implies a shift in input prices 
on electricity for all manufacturing industries. Secondly, the additional revenue generated by 
implementing the reform is recycled back to the economy through uniform percentage cuts in 
the pay roll tax rates, which affect labour costs in all industries. The direct increase in the in-
put prices of electricity of 1.2 Eurocents/KWh, measured in 1999 real values, represents an 
electricity price increase in most manufacturing industries of about 30 percent along the path. 
For the energy-intensive export sector the relative electricity price increase is sharper, as they 
initially enjoy low electricity prices, partly due to lower distribution costs per KWh, and 
partly due to favourable, long-term price contracts with the government. These contracts ex-
pire in 2010. In the first year, the direct price increase amounts to 60 percent as an average for 
the energy-intensive export sector, while the increase is 47 percent in the long run (steady 
state). The revenue recycling implies that the payroll tax rate drops by almost 6 percent in the 
long run (somewhat more in the earlier periods).   
In the long run, the macroeconomic responses to these reform elements can be described by a 
reduced-form, two-equation presentation of the model. It focuses on two main equilibrium 
conditions, the labour market equilibrium and the intertemporal constraint on net foreign 
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wealth, which implies that current account must be zero in the long run in order to prevent net 
wealth from exploding. We refer to Fæhn and Holmøy (2000) for a more comprehensive ex-
planation to the two-equation representation of the CGE model. 
In figure 3.1, the BAU labour market equilibrium is illustrated as an upward sloping locus, L0, 
in the plane defined by the two variables, the utility level, U and the wage rate, w. The slope 
mirrors that an isolated increase in U would increase consumption and contribute to excess 
demand for labour, and that a simultaneous rise in w would be necessary in order to restore 
the labour market equilibrium.The current account restriction is represented as a downward-
sloping locus, B0, implying that increased U, cet. par., would deteriorate the Norwegian cur-
rent account through import leakage and would have to be neutralised by improved competi-
tiveness through reduced w. The BAU equilibrium is marked in the intersection of the two 
loci, in (U0 ,w0).  
Effects of the first reference reform component, the electricity tax shifts, are reflected by the 
intersection point (UAi,wAi) in Figure 3.1. Increasing the electricity tax imposed on manufac-
turing industries has the direct effect of increasing their marginal costs. The labour market 
equilibrium is affected by subsequent shifts in both demand and supply. The downscaling of 
manufacturing output reduces labour demand. Labour supply is reduced, though not to the 
same scale, along with an increase in domestic prices and a subsequent drop in real wages. All 
in all, the immediate effect of the tax increase, prior to equilibrium adjustments, is to create 
unemployment. This is illustrated by the downward shift in the labour market locus to LAi. 
The interpretation of the downward shift is that for a given U, w would have to fall, or equiva-
lently, for a given w, U would have to rise. A fall in w has the effect of discouraging supply 
and stimulating demand of labour, thus restoring the labour market balance. Accordingly, a 
rise in U would imply higher demand for leisure, which reduces labour supply, as well as 
higher demand for consumption goods, which raises labour demand.  
The other component of the reference reform, the decrease in the payroll tax rates, has the 
opposite effect on the labour market: Payroll tax reductions stimulate labour demand (more 
than labour supply) and thus tends to counteract the labour demand deficit and the reactions in 
w and U. The effect of this reform component in the labour market is illustrated by the modi-
fying shift from LAi to LA in Figure 3.1. 
The current account surplus must be zero in the long run (steady state). The electricity tax 
component of the reference reform has the direct effect of reducing competitiveness, espe-
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cially that of the highly export-oriented energy-intensive industries. This creates a substantial 
deficit in the current account prior to equilibrium adjustments. As illustrated by the shift in the 
current account locus from B0 to BAi, this implies that for a given U, w would have to fall, or 
equivalently, for a given w, U would have to fall in order to fulfil the current account restric-
tion. The reasons are that lower wages restore competitiveness, while lower utility implies 
lower import leakage in consumption. Both mechanisms improve the trade balance and the 
current account. The effect on the current account of the simultaneous payroll tax cuts in the 
reference reform is, as for the labour market, to modify the effects on the current account and 
the required reactions in w and U. Thus, a counteracting shift from BAi to BA occurs.  
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Figure 3.1: The reference reform: Determination of long run utility level and wage rate. 
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All in all, the electricity tax shifts are the dominating, and the reference reform implies a 0.7 
percent fall in w in the steady state in scenario 1A compared to the BAU; see Table 3.1. The 
net effect on long-run utility is slightly positive: The simulations result  in a steady-state in-
crease of 0.08 percent. Such low-scale reactions are expected, as the tax changes in these ex-
periments are modest.  
All other steady state changes follow - see Table 3.1. The downscaling of the energy-intensive 
export sector and the gas power generation has strong implications for the capital demand, as 
these sectors are highly capital-intensive. Thus, investments fall. Capital stock in the long run 
drops by 0.38 percent. This, along with a reduction of labour supply of 0.06 percent due to the 
wage drop, explains the long-run GDP fall of 0.35 percent. This mostly takes place in the en-
ergy-intensive export sector, while other industries, including other manufacturing industries, 
increase their output due to several cost-reducing elements, as payroll tax decreases, wage 
decreases, reduced user costs of capital, and reductions in the Nordic electricity price. The 
latter takes place as a consequence of the downscaling of the energy-intensive export sector, 
which leads to a substantial reduction in electricity demand. Net export of electricity in-
creases, and compared to the BAU scenario, the introduction of gas power is delayed by 5 
years (from 2012 to 2017). This reduces the Nordic (pre-tax) price of electricity by between 5 
to 10 percent in periods before gas power is introduced. When gas power is introduced, the 
price is determined by the long-term marginal cost of expanding gas power capacity, and it 
settles on a virtually constant level similar to the BAU. For all industries, except the energy-
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intensive export sector, the impacts of the several cost-reducing elements dominate and ex-
plain their growth.  
Table 3.1: Effects of the reference reform (1A); changes from the BAU scenario.   
 2010 2030 Steady state
GDP -0.02 -0.17 -0.35
Real Capital  -0.10 -0.45 -0.38
Material consumption  0.03 0.09 0.09
Labour supply 0.07 -0.02 -0.06
Utility -0.01 0.06 0.08
Nominal wage rate to workers -0.33 -0.62 -0.70
Price of material consumption -0.52 -0.74 -0.77
Export -0.87 -2.22 -4.20
Import -1.00 -1.52 -1.26
Payroll tax rate -5.2? -7.0? -5.60
Pre-tax electricity price -6.60 -1.20 -1.00
Electricity price (Metals industry) 36.3 49.9 49.6
Gross production (Metals industry) -14.4 -21.5 -27.6
Pure profit, most efficient firm (Metals industry)  -17.2 -25.7 -32.8
 
The welfare gain of this reference reform, measured as the current value of utility changes in 
all periods, is 0.04 percent, which is substantially lower than the long-run impact on the utility 
level. This reflects that a substitution of consumption of leisure, goods and services towards 
later periods takes place. During the first decade, the utility hardly changes, before it starts 
increasing gradually. This mirrors that the consumer prices drop less in the earlier periods 
than in the steady state. The production drop in the energy-intensive export sector is weaker in 
early periods, due to the drop in the pre-tax price of electricity, implying a weaker downward 
pressure on wages. Wages has a strong impact on the costs of living, both directly on the price 
of leisure, and indirectly through prices of goods and services. The dynamics of the electricity 
price, which show a fall only until gas power is exploited (in 2017), work in the opposite di-
rection, but is not that important in the cost of living index.  
Besides the fact that the reform is minor in an economy-wide perspective, the small welfare 
outcome is due to various allocation effects pulling in opposite directions. The reform implies 
reductions of two price wedges in the economy, which, in isolation, tend to improve welfare. 
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The first is the initial electricity price discrimination between different industries; the second 
is the reduction of the, initially considerable, taxation of real labour income. When comes to 
the first, approaching an equal electricity price among industries will allocate relatively more 
electricity input into other industries than the energy-intensive export sector. Besides the ini-
tial electricity tax exemptions, there are other reasons why redirecting resources away from 
the energy-intensive export sector will contribute to improve efficiency. They also enjoy other 
favourable policy measures, as long-term, concessional electricity contracts, and low pay-roll 
taxes, based on their peripheral location. In addition, since domestic prices include a mark-up  
due to monopolistic competition, whereas exports are sold to marginal cost prices, there will 
be efficiency gains from redirecting deliveries into the imperfectly competitive domestic mar-
kets. A reallocation of resources from the heavily export-reliant energy-intensive industries to 
industries oriented towards the domestic markets has this effect.  
Reducing the wedge between the social marginal utility of leisure and the social marginal 
utility generated by labour also has a potential welfare-enhancing effect. In the Norwegian 
economy, the initial wedge is substantial and consists of a marginal tax on labour income, 
approximating 40 percent on average, indirect consumer taxes, including the VAT averaging 
22 percent, and the payroll tax, averaging about 13 percent, and a 5 percent mark-up in the 
domestic industry. A reduced tax wedge will contribute to stimulate employment and improve 
welfare. Employment increases during the first decade. However, received real wages also 
respond to other pressures than the pay roll tax reduction, as described above. In the longer 
run, real wages are almost unaffected and the stimulation of labour supply vanishes and em-
ployment actually falls slightly. Irrespective of the net sign, the welfare contribution from the 
changes in the labour market is of little significance.  
Finally, the reform is associated with a modest terms-of-trade loss that pulls the welfare gain 
downwards. The only international price that responds to domestic behaviour is that of elec-
tricity, which drops until 2017, as explained above. As Norway is a net exporter of electricity 
in the reference reform scenario, this reduces welfare.  
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3.2. The Full Reform: Effects of the compensation  
3.2.1. The role of the compensation scheme design 
We quantify the costs of compensating the energy-intensive export sector through subsidy 
transfers equal to the loss of pure profit rents in the sector. The compensation thus aims at 
maintaining the remuneration of the entrepreneurship within the sector. We investigate the 
compensation costs in case of two different ways of compensating, differing with respect to 
their effect on exit and, thus, the external productivity gains.5 Comparing results between the 
reference reform in 1A and the two full reform cases reveals that introducing compensation 
causes the gain in discounted future utility to fall by 44 percent when productivity gains are 
left out, while the fall is only 16 percent when love-of-variety effects are accounted for. 
Table 3.2: Effects of the full reform with lumpsum subsidies (1B); % changes from the 
BAU scenario.   
 2010 2030 Steady state
GDP -0.06 -0.24 -0.64
Real capital  
Material consumption  -0.03 0.01 -0.10
Labour supply 0.02 -0.11 -0.32
Utility -0.02 0.04 0.05
Nominal wage rate to workers -0.55 -0.89 -1.23
Price of material consumption -0.53 -0.79 -0.63
Export -0.92 -2.31 -4.60
Import -1.05 -1.58 -1.32
Payroll tax rate -2.80 -4.00 2.60 
Pre-tax electricity price -6.60 -1.20 -0.90
Electricity price, Metal industry 36.2 49.9 49.5
Pure profit, most efficient firm, Metal industry  -17.2 -25.7 -33.1
Nb. of firms, Metal  industry -7.12 -9.57 -10.7
Gross production, Metal industry -14.4 -21.6 -28.0
In scenario 1B the changes in resource allocation and welfare are associated with the financ-
ing of the subsidy; see component iii) referred to in Section 2.1. Compared to the reference 
                                                     
5 The model also takes heterogeneity of firms into account, by assuming that the most efficient firms enter the industries first 
and that the less efficient leaves first in case of contraction. This characteristic counteracts the productivity effects associated 
with love-of-variety somewhat. Possible negative productivity contributions from creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt, 
1992) are not modelled.  
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reform (1A), less of the electricity tax revenue can be recycled to the economy via reduced 
payroll tax. The welfare reduction of reserving revenue for subsidies (with no welfare poten-
tial) instead of cutting pay roll taxes, originates first of all from the large difference between 
the social marginal utility of leisure and the social marginal utility generated by labour in the 
Norwegian economy. The fall in labour supply in 1B compared to 1A (see Tables 3.2 and 
3.1), thus, implies welfare losses that contribute significantly to explain the financing costs. 
In scenario 1C, the compensation costs are reduced to 16 percent of the welfare gain. This 
reflects that the isolated effect of the compensation subsidy component in iv) is positive and 
partly offsets the compensation financing component in iii), see Section 2.1. The reason is that 
the only real effects of the compensation subsidy component arise from the external produc-
tivity gain of hampering exit. The number of firms is maintained at a higher level than in sce-
nario 1B. Love-of-variety effects generate a reduction in the producer price index of the en-
ergy intensive export sector, which benefits both domestic producers that use products from 
the energy-intensive export sector as inputs (through productivity increases), and consumers 
who consume their products as final products (through utility increases). Table 3.2. and 3.3. 
report some information on the Metal industry, which constitutes the largest of the industries 
in the energy-intensive export sector. Comparison reveals that while production in the indus-
try is almost unaffected by variations in the compensation scheme, the number of firms are 
maintained as in BAU in Scenario C, while it falls by 10.7 percents compared to BAU in Sce-
nario B. The number of firms also falls in the other industries within the energy-intensive ex-
port sector, though less. An increase in the number of firms in expanding industries is not 
large enough to offset the productivity gain. 
Our estimates illustrate that the distribution of subsidies matters, also when pure efficiency 
effects are considered. In our case the subsidy should be distributed so as to keep up the num-
ber of firms in the industry. We recognise that the optimal scheme will vary from case to case, 
dependent on what are the potential sources of productivity gains. Economies of scale would, 
for instance, call for a system able to stimulate large-scale production. Further, given that a 
love-of-variety model is suitable for the actual case, the model parameters must be regarded as 
uncertain. Comparing scenarios 1B and 1C is thus a useful sensitivity test of the numerical 
contribution of the love-of-variety effect.  
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Table 3.3: Effects of the full reform with productivity gains (1C), % changes from the 
BAU scenario. 
 2010 2030 Steady state
GDP -0.04 -0.21 -0.62
Real capital  
Material consumption  -0.01 0.03 -0.07
Labour supply 0.02 -0.11 -0.33
Utility -0.01 0.05 0.06
Wage rate  -0.458 -0.785 -1.141
Price, material consumption -0.47 -0.67 -0.57
Export -0.86 -2.21 -4.57
Import -0.98 -1.51 -1.26
Payroll tax rate -2.80 -4.00 2.60
Pre-tax electricity price -6.40 -1.00 -0.60
Electricity price, Metal industry  36.6 49.9 49.6
Pure profit, most efficient firm, Metal industry 0 0 0
Nb. of firms, Metal industry  0 0 0
Gross production, Metal industry  -13.0 -20.2 -27.3
 
Irrespective of the love-of-variety contribution, we assess the compensation cost estimates to 
be relatively small, considering the strong degree of openness of the Norwegian economy. 
This reflects that the subsidy required, i.e. the profit loss of the energy intensive export sector, 
is small. Tax incidence effects are the main explanation. True, the possibility to shift taxes on 
to costumers is very limited for the Norwegian energy-intensive export sector. Export shares 
are high and export prices are given in the world markets. We identify some effects on prices 
of domestic deliveries, as well, but these are of little significance, as domestic deliveries con-
stitute only 16 percent6 of the sector's output.  
The main burden shifting takes place on to suppliers of electricity. In periods before gas-
power utilisation is profitable, the pre-tax price on electricity is reduced with about 5-10 per-
cent. About 30 percent of the tax burden is shifted on to producers of electricity in these peri-
ods. This tax shifting is, however, gradually diminishing along the path. The mechanism turn 
out to be more or less analogous to the effects in Bovenberg and Goulder (2001). Their result 
                                                     
6 This refers to the long-run benchmark solution.  
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depends on the possibility for the energy producers to shift the tax burden on to consumers, 
ours on the possibility for the energy consumers to shift tax burden on to input suppliers. The 
effect in Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) is also somewhat similar, though their compensa-
tion scheme is different; they use wage subsidies. They find that supplying a uniform CO2 tax 
in Germany with compensation even tends to increase welfare, in other words they identify 
negative compensation costs. Their experimental reform is very different from ours, not least 
due to the fact that their compensation scheme increases the energy tax rate and thus their 
recycling effects. (Their reforms are performed for a given economy-wide emission level, 
while ours have similar tax rates.) Nevertheless, the electricity market is closed in their simu-
lations and tax incidence effects important. We now proceed by analysing the role of the elec-
tricity market regime in more detail. 
3.3.2 The role of the electricity market openness  
In order to test the sensitivity of the compensation cost results to degrees of tax incidence in 
the electricity market, we introduce the same reforms in electricity market regimes that are, 
respectively, more and less open than the current Nordic market. The sensitivity tests are per-
formed for the cases including the love-of-variety effects. Scenarios labelled 2 reflect the case 
of a closed electricity market. Trade flows are inflexible and the electricity price elasticities 
higher than in the main scenarios 1. In scenarios 3, we simulate the same reforms in an elec-
tricity market where prices are externally fixed. This will simulate a hypothetical, fully open 
electricity market, where profit losses cannot be neutralised by pre-tax electricity price reduc-
tions.  
The main difference between introducing the electricity tax rate to the energy-intensive export 
sector in a regime where electricity is not traded abroad (scenarios 2) and in the main regime, 
when electricity is traded (scenarios 1), is the response in the pre-tax price of electricity in 
periods before gas-power is utilised. The computations for 2010 are reported in Table 3.4. 
Since the supply of electricity is fixed before gas-power sets in, the pre-tax price of electricity 
drops by 13.4 percent in scenarios 2 relative to 1. The accentuated pre-tax electricity price 
reactions reduce the electricity price increase faced by the energy intensive export sector. In 
the Metal industry, electricity prices turn out 22.9 percent lower in case 2 than in case 1. 
Lower costs of taxation borne by the industry imply smaller loss of profit. In the most effi-
cient firm, the pure profit loss falls by 61.0 percent compared to that of case 1. Hence, as an-
ticipated, the revenue needed to compensate for profit losses is lower in a closed electricity 
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market regime than in the Nordic market regime. We find that the necessary compensation 
cost (in terms of reduction in the welfare gain in the corresponding scenarios without com-
pensation) is 29.0 percent lower in this new regime. Along with a smaller subsidy, more reve-
nue is available for payroll tax reductions. This is socially beneficial, because of the large tax 
wedge related to labour. However, the lower need for subsidies in this scenario compared to 
the scenario where electricity is traded abroad, also means a lower stimulation of entry into 
the energy-intensive export sector and less contribution from positive external effects of en-
try.  
Table 3.4: Sensitivity of results to degree of electricity market openness, % changes 
from the main case 
 Closed market Fully open market 
2010:  
Pre-tax electricity price 
 
-13.4 
 
6.5 
2010:  
Electricity price, Metal industry 
 
-22.9 
 
11.9 
2010: 
Pure profit loss, Metal industry, most efficient firm 
 
-61.0 
 
32.2 
Compensation cost -29.0 225.0 
 
In regime 3, with a hypothetical, fully open world market for electricity, the conclusions are 
turned around. There will be no scope for tax incidence in the electricity price even in the 
short run. Thus, compared to the main Nordic market regime in scenario 1, the pre-tax elec-
tricity price in 2010 renders 6.5 percent higher. This implies a higher electricity price paid by 
the energy intensive export sector; for the Metal industry the rise is 11.9 percent compared to 
the main case. The profit fall in the energy-intensive export sector increases in the early peri-
ods; in 2010 by 32.2 percent in the Metal industry. Hence, the revenue needed to compensate 
for their profit losses is higher compared to in the Nordic market regime. As a result, the 
compensation cost in the fully open regime is 2.25 times higher than in the Nordic electricity 
market scenario.  
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4. Conclusions 
Given that today's favouring of the energy intensive export sector is an unavoidable part of 
the Norwegian political surroundings, this analysis shows that there may exist other, less ex-
pensive, ways of keeping up profits than exempting the sector for electricity taxes. Equalising 
the electricity tax and at the same time compensating for the profit losses is welfare improv-
ing compared to the current system. The modest costs associated with compensating the en-
ergy intensive export sector are surprising, because the sector is highly reliant on prices given 
externally at the world markets and has little scope for shifting tax burdens on to customers. 
We do, however, identify a tax shifting on to suppliers of electricity in the Nordic market. The 
market, though internationalised the last decade, still responds considerably to Norwegian 
policy changes. Electricity markets are, however, in a process of deregulation and expansion 
in several areas, and this will tend to increase the political costs of removing energy tax ex-
emptions within several countries.  
We also point out the advantage of designing schemes that release possible productivity ex-
ternalities within the sector. Stimulating entry of new firms may have such effects, either 
through love-of-variety effects, as in our model, or through other productivity-enhancing 
mechanisms like creative destruction or embodied technological change.  
Our study also reveals that the welfare gains of removing the Norwegian electricity tax ex-
emptions are small. This could be an argument for keeping today's system intact. But the sys-
tem also has other disadvantages: Recently, the Surveillance Authorities of EFTA (ESA) has 
questioned the legacy of the Norwegian discriminatory practice and claimed that it conflicts 
with the competition rules of the European Economic Area. We have restricted our analysis to 
how distributional and efficiency concerns can be combined. The challenges from ESA also 
arise other questions, as how concerns for practicability and legality can be accounted for. 
These are the beyond the scope of this study. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: Production Activities in MSG-6 
MSG-6 Code Production Activities 
11 Agriculture 
12 Forestry 
13 Fishing 
14 Breeding of Fish 
21 Fish Products 
22 Meat and Dairy Products 
16 Grain, Vegetables, Fruit, Oils, etc. 
17 Beverages and Tobacco 
18 Textiles, wearing Appeal and Footwear 
26 Furniture and Fixtures 
27 Chemical and Mineral Products, incl. Mining and Quarrying 
28 Printing and Publishing 
34 Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles 
37 Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals 
41 Gasoline 
42A Diesel Fuel 
42B Heating Fuels, Paraffin, etc. 
43 Manufacture of Metals 
46 Manufacture of Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 
47 Hired Work and Repairs 
48 Building of Ships 
49 Manufacture and repair of oil drilling rigs and ships, oil production platforms etc. 
55 Construction, excl. of Oil Well Drilling 
60 Ocean Transport - Foreign 
63 Finance and Insurance 
66 Crude Oil 
67 Natural Gas 
68 Services in Oil and Gas Exploration 
69 Pipeline Transport of Oil and Gas 
71 Production of Electricity 
72 Power Net Renting 
73 Sales and Distribution of Electricity 
75 Car and Other Land Transportation 
76 Air Transport 
77 Railroads and Electrical Commuters 
78 Ocean Transport - Domestic 
79 Post and Tele Communication 
81 Wholesale and Retail Trade 
83 Dwelling Services 
85 Other Private Services 
89 Imputed Service Charges from Financial Institutions 
 Government Input Activities 
 Central Government 
92C Defense Exclusive of Military Submarines and Aircraft 
92U Military Submarines and Aircraft 
93S Central Government Education and Research 
94S Central Government Health-Care and Veterinary Services etc. 
95S Other Central Government Services 
 Local Government 
93K Local Government Education and Research 
94K Local Government Health-Care and Veterinary Services etc. 
95K Other Local Government Services 
24 
Appendix B 
B.1  Consumer behavior 
In year t the representative consumer chooses a path of “utility”, F, by maximizing intertemporal 
utility given by 
(B.1) ( ) FFs
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1
1
1
−
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= −
+= ∑  
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, see Bye and Holmøy (1997) for further details. σF is the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in utility. The intertemporal utility maximization gives the 
demand for utility 
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where r is the world market interest rate on financial wealth, tD is the tax rate on capital income, λ is 
the marginal utility of wealth and PF is the ideal price index of utility. Utility is a CES-composite of 
material consumption, C, and leisure, LE. The corresponding ideal price index is given by 
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where PC is the price index of material consumption and PLE is the price of leisure (net of tax wage 
rate) measured in efficiency units such as labor, implying that the price of leisure must be adjusted 
with g, the factor augmenting technical change. σC  is the elasticity of substitution between material 
consumption and leisure, and αC is the intensity parameter for material consumption. In each period 
utility is distributed between leisure and material consumption, see Bye (2003) for further details.  
 
B.2  Intertemporal equilibrium 
A necessary condition for reaching a steady state solution is 
(B.4) ( ) ( )( ) Fgtr D σρ 11111 ++=−+  
which is a “razor’s edge” condition since r, tD, ρ and g which determines the long run (steady state) 
growth rate of the economy, are all considered as exogenous. In the analyses, equation (B.4) is 
assumed to hold at all points in time. 
 
B.3  Data and parameters 
The model is calibrated to the 1999 national accounts. For the production functions the elasticities of 
substitution between machinery and energy, the elasticity of substitution between the energy-
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machinery aggregate and labor and the elasticity of substitution between the modified real value added 
and various material inputs (see figure B.1.), are adjusted to parameters of a Generalized Leontief 
(GL) cost function estimated on time-series data from the national accounts, see Alfsen et al (1996). 
The elasticities of substitution between electricity and fuel oil in the energy aggregate are based on 
CES-function estimates on time series data by Mysen (1991). Most of these elasticities of substitution 
are smaller than 1. The elasticities of substitution between non-polluting and polluting transports, and 
the corresponding elasticities between the modified real value aggregate and various material inputs 
are set to 0.5, for all industries. 
 
In the model of producer behavior the elasticities of transformation between deliveries to the domestic 
and foreign market are set equal to 4. The elasticities of scale in different industries are then calibrated 
to 0.83, given the elasticities of transformation. The elasticities of substitution between domestic 
products and imported goods are partly based on estimated parameters (see e.g. Svendsen (1990)), but 
adjusted upwards such that all are around 4. For further details of the calibration of the model of 
producer behavior, see Holmøy and Hægeland (1997). 
 
In the consumer model the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σF, equals 0.3, Steigum (1993). 
Econometric estimates of σF vary considerably between different sources, and 0.3 is in the lower end 
of the range of the estimated parameters. The uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.1 
percent, which is based on estimates of labor supply for married women and men on micro-data by 
Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995). This is consistent with the calibrated elasticity of substitution 
between material consumption and leisure of 0.6, and the share of leisure in the utility aggregate of 
0.4, see also Bye, Holmøy and Strøm (1999) for details. The calibration of the parameters in the 
complete demand system for material consumption is based on detailed econometric studies using 
both micro and macro data, see Wold (1998). 
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Figure B.1. Production technology  
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Figure B.2. Material Consumption 
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